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NOTE

McCleskey v. Kemp: The Shadow of
Racism on the Capital Sentencing Process
The Court today holds that Warren McCleskey's sentence was
constitutionally imposed. It finds no fault in a system in which
lawyers must tell their clients that race casts a large shadow
on the capital sentencing process.'
-Justice William Brennan,
dissenting in McCleskey v. Kemp 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1987, Warren McCleskey, a black convicted of capital
murder in Georgia, lost his United States Supreme Court appeal of his
death sentence. His claims relied primarily on a statistical study which
illustrates the existence of racially disparate treatment in Georgia's
capital sentencing system, in that murder defendants whose victims
were white are more likely to receive a death sentence than those whose
victims were black.' The study indicates that this disparity results at
least in part from the discretion afforded prosecuting attorneys in
4
capital cases.
In reaching its holding in McCleskey, the Supreme Court declined
to apply the same level of review to prosecutors' exercises of discretion
in seeking the death penalty as it applies to their exercises of discretion
in challenging potential jurors on voir dire.' The Court held paramount
the need to preserve sentencing discretion in criminal cases and noted
the difficulty of channeling prosecutors' discretion without destroying
it. 6

This article examines McCleskey v. Kemp and the Court's treatment of the issue of discretion. Included in Part II of this Note is a
1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1782 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1763-64.
4. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
5. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1767-69.
6. Id. at 1778 n.37 and accompanying text.
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brief review of the history of Georgia's capital sentencing statute and
a discussion of the facts and holdings in McCleskey. Part III summa-

rizes the results of the statistical study used in McCleskey's appeal in
order to show the strength of the case he presented to the Court. One

must remember that Warren McCleskey was not the first-and will not
be the last-capital defendant processed through this system.

Part IV of the article is a discussion of the issue of discretion and

the Supreme Court's handling of this issue in McCleskey. What is
found to be particularly troublesome in Georgia's capital sentencing
system is the unguided, unreviewable discretion prosecutors have to
seek the death penalty in murder cases. 7 Furthermore, the flawed

method by which the state supreme court conducts proportionality

reviews of death sentences does not serve, as it should, to identify and
correct improper exercises of prosecutorial discretion. 8 The Court dis-

claimed the need for any changes with respect to prosecutorial exercises

of discretion 9 and praised Georgia's review process. 10 However, there

is much room for improvement on both counts, and Part IV suggests
how such improvements might be accomplished.'

7. See id. at 1768 n.17 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
9. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1778 n.37 and accompanying text. ("Prosecutorial
decisions necessarily involve both judgmental and factual decisions that vary from case
to case." (emphasis added).)
10. See id. at 1772.
11. Warren McCleskey's case may not have been the best choice for testing the
constitutional arguments put forth. Baldus, the author of the statistical study upon
which McCleskey relied, claimed that McCleskey belonged to the class of defendants
most likely to be discriminated against by the Georgia system. That is, McCleskey was
black, his victim white, and the circumstances of his crime fell into an intermediate
level of aggravation where discretion is more likely to be improperly exercised. However,
Baldus' interpretation that McCleskey fell into the intermediate level is arguably
fallacious. The two statutory aggravating factors in McCleskey's case, i.e., that his
victim was a police officer and he killed the officer in connection with an armed
robbery, show a relatively low level of aggravation just in terms of the number of
factors. However, practically speaking, the fact the legislature saw a need for a special
aggravating factor for the murder of a police officer reflects a societal determination
that killing a police officer in the line of duty is a particularly abhorrent crime.
Moreover, the police officer was shot in the face with a .38 caliber weapon. It is only
natural for jurors or prosecutors to experience a measure of horror at such an act, and
these circumstances might well have lowered the "threshold" separating deathworthy
from non-deathworthy defendants. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. It is
arguable, therefore, that McCleskey's case did not fall into a gray area of intermediate
aggravation, but was actually more appropriately considered highly aggravated. Also,
in light of the societal determination regarding the appropriate sentence for murdering
police officers, it is not suprising the Court would balk at overturning McCleskey's
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It is this author's hope that the Supreme Court will reconsider and
modify its holdings in McCleskey before Georgia executes defendants
who were unfairly sentenced to die.
II.

BACKGROUND

In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 2 the United States Supreme
Court held, per curiam, that all death sentencing statutes in effect at
that time were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. In his concurring opinion,
Justice White noted that the death penalty in the United States was
"exacted with great infrequency for even the most atrocious crimes
and that there [was] no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it [was] imposed from the many cases in which it [was]
not." 3 Further, Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurrence suggesting
that capital punishment was being "wantonly and ... freakishly
imposed." 4 Stewart even went so far as to analogize the probability
of receiving a death sentence to the unpredictable likelihood of being
struck by lightning. 5
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,16 the Supreme Court upheld
Georgia's new capital sentencing statute, which improves on the old
statute in two ways. First the jury is required to find at least one
statutory aggravating factor to be present in a given case before a
death sentence can be imposed. 7 Second, the statute provides for

sentence.
The success of the arguments put forth relied heavily on a determination that
McCleskey belonged to a class of defendants who were placed at a substantial risk of
being discriminated against, that is, the intermediate level of aggravation. Absent this
showing, McCleskey couldn't show the critical need for a higher standard of review
for prosecutorial exercises of discretion. Had his case been a more representative
example of the cases most subject to the risk of discrimination, McCleskey might have
had a better foundation for his argument that a presumption of discrimination should
be made in his case.
Unfortunately, because the Court did not decide the case based on a finding that
McCleskey did not truly fall into the high-risk group, but instead on blanket assertions
regarding discretion and the burden of proof for a presumption of discrimination,
other defendants who do fall into the high-risk group will be confronted with a standard
which will likely be insurmountable.
12. 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
13. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
14. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
17. The Furman statutes, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior
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mandatory proportionality review by the state supreme court of all
death sentences.18 In Gregg, the Court interpreted Furman to mandate
to July 1, 1969)-the statute under which the petitioner in Furman was sentenced, and
GA. CAnm. CODE § 26-1101 (1971 rev.) (effective from July 1, 1969)-the statute in
effect at the time the court reviewed the case, both simply gave the jury the discretion
to choose between life imprisonment or the death sentence, without giving the jury any
guidance as to how to decide which sentence was appropriate. The Gregg statute, GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975), provided sentencing guidelines, as does the
current statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982). In order to impose the death
sentence, the jury must find at least one of ten statutory aggravating factors. The
statute provides:
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft
hijacking or treason in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be
authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to
the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony;
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or
arson in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in
a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor, or former district attorney or solicitor was committed
during or because of the exercise of his official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) . The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his
official duties;
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who
has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed .for the purpose of avoiding, inter-
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"that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body

....

that

fering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be
warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury
for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death,
shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In
nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of
treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code section is so found,
the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Code 1933, § 27-2523.1, enacted by 1973 Ga. Laws, 1 §3, p. 159:
18. Id. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (1982) provides for automatic proportionality
review:
17-10-35. Review of death sentences by Supreme Court generally; forwarding of
record and transcript by clerk of trial court; scope of review; right of
defendant and state to submit written briefs and present oral argument;
similar cases to be included in decision; direct appeal to be consolidated
with sentence review.
(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by
the Supreme Court of Georgia. The clerk of the trial court, within ten days
after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to
the Supreme Court together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report
prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the title and docket
number of the case, the name of the defendant and the name and address of
his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the
punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of a standard
questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Supreme Court.
(b) The Supreme Court shall consider the punishment as well as any
errors enumerated by way of appeal.
(c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the
evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance as enumerated in subsection (b) of Code Section 17-10-30;
and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.
(d) Both the defendant and the state shall have the right to submit
briefs within the time provided by the court and to present oral argument to
the court.
(e) The court shall include in its discretion a reference to those similar
cases which it took into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding
correction of errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall
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discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 9 The Gregg statute's
enumeration of aggravating factors was found to satisfy this requirement for suitable direction and limitation of the jury's sentencing

discretion. Only in those cases where the jury found one or more of
these factors to be present could the defendant receive a death sentence,
thereby preventing the purely freakish and random imposition of death

which occurred under the statute in Furman.

Georgia's statutory scheme was also found to satisfactorily "focus
the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," 20 as required
by the Supreme Court's decision in Woodson v. North Carolina.2
Additionally, the Court found the mandatory proportionality review
by the Georgia Supreme Court to be further "assurance that the
concerns that prompted [the] decision in Furman [were] not present to
any significant degree" in Georgia's new statutory sentencing scheme. 22
Georgia's capital sentencing system faced yet another challenge in
McCleskey v. Kemp. 23 The petitioner in McCleskey was convicted in
be authorized to:

(1) Affirm the sentence of death; or
(2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by
the trial judge based on the record and argument of counsel. The records
of those similar cases referred to by the Supreme Court in its decision and
the extracts prepared as provided for in subsection (a) of Code Section 1710-37 shall be provided to the resentencing judge for his consideration.
(f)The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken,
and the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court
shall render its decision on legal errors enumerated, the factual substantiation
of the verdict, and the validity of the sentence.
Code 1933, § 27-2537, enacted by 1973 Ga. Laws, § 4, p. 159.
19. 428 U.S. at 189.
20. Id.at 206.
21. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding Florida's mandatory death sentence statute
unconstitutional).
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
23. 107 S.Ct. 1756, reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 3199 (1987). On December 23,
1987, Warren McCleskey's convictions and death sentence were overturned by U.S.
District Judge J.Owen Forrester of the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of
Georgia. McCleskey successfully argued that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had been violated under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), because one
of the witnesses against him was "planted" by the police in an adjoining cell for the
purpose of obtaining incriminating statements. The State is currently appealing. See
generally Note, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Statistics and the Death Penalty, 15 W.
ST. U.L. Rav. 179 (1987); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Baldus Statistical Study
Insufficient to Show Discrimination in Administration of Death Penalty, 27 WASH-
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1978 in Fulton County, Georgia, of two counts of armed robbery and
one count of murder. McCleskey was black. His victim was a white
police officer. At the penalty hearing, 2A the jury found two statutory

aggravating factors to exist in McCleskey's case beyond a reasonable

doubt. McCleskey offered no mitigating evidence to help offset the
jury's findings. 2 The jury recommended a death sentence. The aggravating factors found by McCleskey's jury were that the murder was

committed during an armed robbery, 26 and the victim was a police

officer acting in the line of duty.27 On automatic review, the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld McCleskey's conviction and his death sentence. 21
In his subsequent appeals to overturn his death sentence, 29 McCleskey argued that Georgia's capital sentencing system is administered

in a racially discriminatory fashion, resulting in a disproportionate
number of death sentences meted out to defendants whose victims were
white. To support his claim that the statute is discriminatorily applied,

thereby violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, McCleskey
relied heavily on an empirical study of the state's capital sentencing

L.J. 194 (1987); Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating
Contemporary Death Sentence Systems: Lessons From Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 1375 (1985).
BURN

24. GA. CODE ANm. § 17-10-2(c) (1982) provides that when a jury convicts a
defendant of murder, "the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence
hearing before the jury." While this would seem to indicate that all defendants convicted
of murder are subjected to a penalty hearing where the jury considers imposing a death
sentence, in actual practice such hearings are held only when the prosecutor affirmatively
seeks the death penalty. If the prosecutor does not request the death penalty consider-

ation, the case does not advance to a penalty trial, and the defendant receives a sentence
of life imprisonment. See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CnRM. L. &
CRtmmoLoGy 661, 674 n.56 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus, ComparativeReview].
25. 107 S. Ct. at 1763.
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (1982). See supra note 17.
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (1982). See supra note 17.
28. McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980).
29. After a series of denied petitions for new trial and writs of habeas corpus
and certiorari, petitioner filed a claim in the federal District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, claiming that the Georgia capital sentencing process is discriminatorily administered and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The
District Court dismissed and petitioner appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985). The appellate court
affirmed, with three judges dissenting. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
affirmed. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

system3 ° compiled by Professors David C. Baldus, 3' George Wood-

worth,32 and Charles Pulanski.33
The Court rejected McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment claim,

holding that he had failed to meet either of the two burdens necessary
to prove a violation of the equal protection clause. First, he failed to
prove "the existence of purposeful discrimination" by the state of
34
Georgia in either adopting or maintaining its capital sentencing statute.
Second, he failed to prove that there had been "a discriminatory

effect" on his specific case.35

McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim was also rejected, on the
alternative grounds that (1) he had not demonstrated his sentence was
"disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense"; 3 6 (2) that he
had failed to show the Georgia statute operated in an arbitrary and

capricious manner;3 7 and (3) that he had failed to prove that the
Georgia capital sentencing system was arbitrary and capricious as it
was applied.38 Specifically, the Supreme Court refused to infer either

discrimination or arbitrariness and capriciousness in McCleskey's case
from the statistics in the Baldus Study. 39 Notwithstanding the use of
statistical studies as proof of abuse of discretion in jury selection cases 4
30. Results of the study may be found in (as quoted from the Record)
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (1984); McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756
(1987). See also Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in
the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15
STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986).
31. Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. LL.M. Yale University,
1969.
32. Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law. LL.B. Yale
University.
33. Associate Professor of Statistics, University of Iowa. Ph.D. University of
Minnesota, 1966.
34. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766, citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550
(1967); see also 107 S. Ct. at 1769.

35. Id. at 1766, citing Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
36. Id. at 1774. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).

37. See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
38. See id. at 1775-78.
39. Id. at 1769.
40. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (2 to 1 disparity between the
number of Mexican-Americans in the county's population and the number summoned
for jury duty); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (1.6 to 1 disparity between the
number of blacks in the county's population and the number on grand jury lists);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (3 to 1 disparity between the number of eligible
blacks in the county and the number of blacks on grand jury venires). For the general
proposition that statistical evidence need not always present a stark pattern to be
accepted as sole proof of discriminatory intent, see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

MCCLESKEY V. KEMP

1987:173]

and Title VII employment discrimination. cases, 41 the Court, as a
practical matter, refused to extend this method of proof to cases
involving discretionary decisions by prosecutors to seek the death
penalty. 42 The Court reasoned that discretion is "essential" to the
criminal justice system, and therefore it would "demand exceptionally
clear proof before [it] would infer that the discretion has been abused. ' 43
In the Court's opinion, the Baldus Study simply did not meet this
higher burden of proof, thus no inference of abuse could be made. 44
The Court further supported this reasoning by finding that the
Georgia capital sentencing system is structured to provide safeguards
against the abuse of discretion.4 The state's sentencing guidelines for
juries" and bifurcated trial process, 47 combined with mandatory proportionality review by the Georgia Supreme Court of all death sentences, 48 are cited by the McCleskey majority as providing adequate
safeguards for preventing abuse of discretion. 49 However, this conclusion by the Court begs the question, for the Baldus Study's results
demonstrate very clearly that the Georgia system does not provide
adequate protection to defendants who murder white people.

III.

THE NUMBERS

GAME: THE STRENGTH OF THE CASE FOR
CHANGE

McCleskey's bid to overturn his death sentence relied extensively
on the results of the Baldus Study, a multiple regression statistical
analysis of Georgia's capital sentencing system. 0 It is actually a com-

41. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986) (multiple regression statistical
analysis allowed to prove statutory violations of Title VII; analysis need not include
every conceivable variable to establish case, as long as it includes major factors likely
to influence decisions).
42. See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1767-680.
43. Id. at 1769.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1772.

46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1982). The defendant is first tried for the
charged offense. Only after guilt is determined by the jury does the question of
sentencing arise. The sentence is determined in a separate, post-trial sentencing hearing.
48. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49. McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1772.
50. Multiple regression analysis is used to show how independent variables affect
a dependent variable. In the Baldus Study the dependent variable is the sentencing
variable. The goal is to be able to predict what will happen to the dependent variable
if an independent variable is changed, or in hindsight, what would have happened to
the dependent variable if the independent variable had been different. For example,
consider a case of a defendant who is black, whose victim was white, who has a fifth
grade education, who killed his victim during the course of a felony-kidnapping, who
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bination of two separate studies,"1 based on a total of 2,484 murder

cases in Georgia between 1973 and 1978. The Study accounts for the
effects of more than 400 possible variables which can influence sentencing decisions, including 230 non-racial variables, such as the number
of victims, whether the victim was known to the defendant, and whether
the murder was committed in the course of the commission of another

felony.

2

The results of the Baldus Study show that Georgia prosecutors'

unbridled and unreviewable discretion to request the death penalty has
contributed to a marked disparity in the rate of death sentences imposed
on defendants whose victims were white.53 While the critical factor is

the victim's race, a lesser disparity also exists based on the defendant's
race,54 i.e., blacks who kill whites have the greatest chance of receiving
a death sentence." The plain facts are "that defendants charged with
killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced
to death as defendants charged with killing blacks, ' 5 6 and "6 of every
11 defendants convicted of killing a white person would not have

received the death penalty if their victims had been black. '5 7 Compare

these figures to cases where the defendant was the prime mover in
committing the murder. That fact will only increase the defendant's
has two prior felony convictions, and who expresses no remorse for the crime. The
jury has imposed the death sentence. The purpose of multiple regression is to attempt
to predict what the jury's sentencing recommendation would have been had any of
these characteristics been absent or different, and also to attempt to predict the outcome
of future similar cases. Multiple regression separates the effects of causal variables
which are partially intertwined. To determine whether race had an effect on sentencing,
the researcher must consider other variables which correlate both to race and to
sentencing decisions-for example, limited education or prior convictions. A prior
conviction can itself be a factor of race discrimination if the system is in fact
discriminatory, so it is even more important to take into account the various effects of
that variable. See generally, Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80
CoLIJM. L. Rnv. 702 (1980); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression
Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 CoLusm. L. REv. 737 (1980); D.
BELsLEY, E. Kut & R. WELCH, REGREsSION DIAGNosnCs (1980); R. PInDYcK & D.
RUBINFELD, ECONOMETIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECAsTs (2d ed. 1981).
51. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353 (1984). The two studies referred
to are the Procedural Reform Study, covering the period March 1973 through June
1978, and the Chargingand Sentencing Study, covering the period March 1973 through
December 1978.
52. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1799-1800 n.7 (1987).
53. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
54. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1799 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1763.
56. Id. at 1782 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
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chance of a death sentence 2.3 times, nearly half the increased risk
attributable to having a white victim1 8
In his study, Baldus identifies three levels of death penalty cases.
The first level is where the aggravating factors are so minimal that a
reasonable jury will exercise virtually no discretion in determining the
defendant's sentence because it is clear that the death penalty is
inappropriate. 9 Of the 88 cases that fell into this category, no death
sentences had been recommended. 60 The second level is where the
aggravating factors are so extreme that any reasonable person (who
does not reject capital punishment in all cases) would agree that death
is the appropriate punishment; again, the jury will exercise minimal
discretion in choosing the sentence. 6' Of the 58 cases that fell into this
second category, the jury recommended death in 88%.62 The third level
is the one to which Professor Baldus testified that the petitioner in
McCleskey belonged. 63 In these cases, there is an intermediate level of
aggravation, and the question of whether death is appropriate is less
easily answered. 64
It is in this intermediate level of cases where the jury will exercise
the greatest degree of discretion, because there is considerably more
room for reasonable minds to differ on the issue of whether death is
the appropriate punishment.61 "Even when acting under statutory
guidance, individuals will differ in their assessments of when death
sentences are warranted. . . . Most people apparently have thresholds
that separate the 'deathworthy"' defendants from all others. 66 The
implication is that statutory guidelines limiting the jury's discretion
cannot eliminate all randomness or freakishness in death sentencing67
because there is no way to predict in the intermediate level which
defendants will get death sentences and which will not." The one factor
which appears to allow for a measure of predictability is the race of
58. Id. at 1800 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1784, n.2.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id.at 1764 n.5..
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 1327, 1352 (1985).
67. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
68. Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence in Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1275, 1313-1317 (1985).
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the victim. Juries recommended death sentences in 34% of intermediate
the defendant was white, and in 14% where the victim
level cases where
69
was black.

As pronounced as this disparity in sentencing decisions by juries
is, it is much less than the disparity demonstrated in an examination
70
of the prosecutorial decision to advance to a penalty trial. The Baldus
Study shows that prosecutors in Georgia sought the death penalty in
70% of the cases where the defendant was black and the victim white,
in 32% where both the defendant and victim were white, in 19% of
and in only
cases where the defendant was white and the victim black,
7'
black.
were
victim
and
defendant
the
15070 where both
In the actual imposition of death sentences, the numbers show
that defendants charged with killing whites received the death penalty
of defendants charged with killing
in 11% of the cases. 72 Only 1%
73
sentences.
death
blacks received
The state's argument in response to these statistical findings was
that white-victim cases tend to be more aggravated and less mitigated
than black-victim cases, and that this explains the high percentage of
black-victim cases that are "left behind at the life sentence and voluntary manslaughter stages." '7 4 At the plea bargaining stage and at the
time the prosecutor requests a penalty trial, defendants whose victims
were black will drop out of the pool of death-eligible cases because
their crimes are either not aggravated enough or because there are
sufficient 75mitigating elements present to make a death sentence inappropriate.
This argument may, in fact, partially explain why prosecutors

request a penalty trial in white-victim cases in such overwhelming
proportions as opposed to black-victim cases.76 However, in McCleskey,
69. McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
71. McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1763-64.

72. Id.at 1763.
73. Id.
74. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (1984).
75. For a similar argument made by the state of Florida, see Spinkellink v.
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). The state
argued, unsupported by empirical evidence, that homicides of black victims tended to
result from "family quarrels, lovers' quarrels, liquor quarrels, [and] barroom quarrels,"
id.at 612 n.37. The argument overlooked the fact that in making the comparison
between black and white victim cases, petitioner had limited the examination to felony
homicides, which necessarily excludes killings which result from quarrels. Gross, supra
note 68, at 1286, n.53.
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text.
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the evidence showed that "among defendants with aggravating and
mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey, 20 of every 34 would not
have been sentenced to die if their victims had been black" instead of
white. 77 Thus, even where the levels of aggravation and mitigation are
comparable, racial disparity in the imposition of death sentences is still
found to be present. Such disparity is also largely attributable to the
much higher rate of prosecutorial requests for penalty hearings in white
victim cases.
Cases with high aggravation levels would seem to be most likely
to prompt a request for a penalty hearing, but prosecutors do not
apply this principle evenhandedly. In white-victim cases where there
were three statutory aggravating factors present, prosecutors requested
penalty trials 74% of the time (50 of 68 cases). 78 In black-victim cases
with the same number of statutory aggravating factors, penalty trials
were requested only 39% of the time (12 of 31 cases). 79 Where four
statutory aggravating factors were present, penalty trials were requested
in 81% of the white-victim cases (43 of 53), but in only 22% of the
black-victim cases (2 of 9).80
McCleskey probably could not have presented a stronger case of
the existence of racial discrimination in the Georgia capital sentencing
system than that demonstrated by the Baldus Study, short of admissions
by prosecutors and jurors that they are harsher on murderers of whites.
However, the Court was unwilling to overturn McCleskey's death
sentence absent some showing that the prosecutor had acted improperly
in his case.8 l The unfortunate result of the Court's reluctance is that it
legitimizes the continuation of a system of punishment that is clearly
operating unfairly.

IV.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: CONTROLLING THE POWER TO

DISCRI1MINATE

Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of
discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice
2
or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness.
-Kenneth

Culp Davis

77. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1782 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 24, at 709, Table 6A.
Id.
Id.
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969).
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A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF DISCRETION

Discretion is exercised whenever the limits on an official's power
leave her free to choose between courses of action or inaction, and she
83
decides what is best in light of the pertinent facts and applicable law.
In criminal prosecutions the choices include leniency. However, "the
power to be lenient is the power to discriminate.' ' 4 It is this power
that must be controlled if the criminal justice system is to operate
fairly.
In the typical capital sentencing system, discretion is vested in four
bodies or officials: 1) the legislature, 2) the prosecutor, 3) the jury, and
4) the reviewing court. 5 The legislature identifies and defines those
crimes it considers to be death-eligible. This is accomplished either by
creating aggravated forms of murder or by providing the sentencing
authority with a list of "relevant, non-vague statutory 'aggravating
circumstances'. '"86 The prosecutor decides who to try for capital murder. This includes pretrial decisions about charging and plea bargaining,
as well as presenting sentence recommendations to the court at or after
the trial.87 The jury exercises its discretion at two stages-first in
determining whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
and again at the penalty trial where a choice is made between life or
death sentences.81 Finally, the death sentence is reviewed by the state

83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 170. "Logically, discretionary power to favor an individual cannot
exist without discretionary power not to favor him. Practically, discretionary power to

favor one individual means power to discriminate, power to refuse even-handed justice."

Id. at 172. Flexibility in the law is a desirable objective. See, e.g., Woodson v. N.
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (requiring "individualized" sentencing determinations;
the flexibility of discretionary death penality statutes remedies the harshness of mandatory statutes by allowing jury to consider mitigating factors); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 603 (1978) ("Most would agree that 'the 19th century movement away from

mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened introduction of flexibility into the

sentencing process."') (emphasis added). However, once achieved, flexibility should
not be allowed to serve as a means of denying justice to those whom society finds
repulsive or whom an individual prosecutor finds unsympathetic.
85. Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on CapitalPunishment, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1113, 1117

(1985).
86. Id.
87. See id.

88. Id. The jury's discretion, however, is guided by the legislature. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
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supreme court to determine whether it is proportional to the sentences
imposed in similar cases.89
The Supreme Court has not found discretion to be so important

to the capital sentencing system as to be allowed to go unchecked.
Legislatures cannot require mandatory death sentences for broad categories of homicides, 90 nor can they statutorily limit the sentencer's
consideration of mitigating factors. 91 The Supreme Court has also held

that juries should not be left to their own devices in determining

sentences, but should instead have their discretion "guided" by the
legislature, so as to ensure that recommendations for death sentences
do not occur arbitrarily or capriciously. 92 Nor can prosecutors exercise
their discretion in making peremptory challenges of potential jurors so
as to purposely exclude blacks or other minorities solely because of
race. 93
B.

THE MCCLESKEY APPROACH TO DISCRETION

In McCleskey, the Supreme Court focused on the exercise of
discretion by the legislature, jury, and reviewing court. The Court
found no abuse of legislative discretion because the states can impose
the death penalty for murder without violating the Constitution. 94
Georgia's statutory "guidance" of jury discretion through the enumeration of aggravating factors was also found to be constitutionally
sufficient. 9 Finally, the automatic appeal of death sentences to the
Georgia Supreme Court, and that court's proportionality review of the
sentences, were viewed by the McCleskey majority as "an important
89. See Hubbard, supra note 85, at 1118.
90. Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death sentence
statute held unconstitutional; the respect for human dignity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of particular characteristics of individual defendant
and particular nature of his crime).
91. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (death sentence statute held unconstitutional where legislature provided severe statutory aggravating factors and three
statutory mitigating factors; prohibiting sentencer to consider any but the statutory
mitigating factors does not provide the sort of individualized determination of sentence
required by Eighth Amendment).
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
93. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
94. See McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1769, 1771-72. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court
stated that "the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without
justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe." 428 U.S. at 187.
95. McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1772. The Court suggested that "while some jury
discretion still exists, 'the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective
standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application."' 107 S. Ct. at 1772,
quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976).
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additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice" in the operation
of the capital sentencing system. 96
This reliance on statutory guidelines to limit the jury's discretion,
and on the state supreme court to correct any abuses of the jury's
limited discretion, ignores the problem of the potential abuse of
prosecutorialdiscretion. 97 Furthermore, the state supreme court's "proportionality review" of death sentences is not necessarily the "safeguard" the Supreme Court deems it to be.9
First, prosecutors do not routinely seek penalty trials in cases'
where the defendant is death-eligible. 99 Where prosecutors do not
affirmatively seek a death sentence, no penalty trial is held, even though
the statute would seem to require it in all cases.1°° The state's argument,
that black-victim cases are less aggravated, cannot stand when the data
is analyzed. 10 1 Even after comparing the levels of aggravation, it is clear
that racial disparity exists in the rate at which prosecutors request
penalty trials in white-victim cases. The statistics do bear out the
argument that fewer black-victim murders have high aggravation levels
than do white-victim murders.102 However, that argument does not
explain the overall low death sentencing rate in black-victim cases.
It is true that the number of death sentences in black-victim cases
would necessarily be lower than in white-victim cases. Currently, however, not only the number, but the percentage rate of sentencing is very
low. It is this percentage rate difference in cases of comparable
aggravation levels that most clearly shows the disparity in Georgia's
system. Moreover, if it is the interracial nature of black-defendant/
white-victim murders, and the alleged interracial bitterness and animosity accompanying them which makes these crimes more highly
aggravated, it is difficult to explain why white-defendant/black-victim
murders do not have comparable death penalty request/imposition
rates.103 Whether the true explanation is either that black lives are held

96. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1772, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198
(1976).
97. See Baldus, ComparativeReview, supra note 24, at 706-10.
98. See Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 24, at 710-27. See also infra
notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
100. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1982), supra note 24. After the jury finds
the defendant guilty, "the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence
heraing before the jury."
101. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
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in less esteem than white lives'04 or simply that there continues to be
more outrage about black-on-white violence than in the reverse situation, 105 it is unconscionable to allow the current system to continue
unchecked. There are undoubtedly more black-victim cases that should
advance to a penalty trial, while probably fewer white-victim cases are
truly appropriate for advancement. The problem becomes the channeling of discretion so that prosecutors are neither lenient when they
should be tough nor tough when they should be lenient. Black victims
are entitled to as much justice as white victims, and those who kill
whites are entitled to a fair hearing of their case, without improper
considerations of race affecting the outcome.
C.

CHANNELING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

The majority in McCleskey v. Kemp wrote that it would be
"difficult to imagine" a way in which the prosecutor's discretion could
be guided and still have a fair criminal justice system.'06 In his dissent,
Justice Stevens recommends narrowing the class of death-eligible cases
to those very highly aggravated cases where the Baldus Study shows
no racial effect. 0 7 Justice Blackmun agreed and also suggested that
"the establishment of guidelines . .. as to the appropriate basis for
exercising [prosecutorial] discretion at the various steps in the prosecution of a case would provide at least a measure of consistency."' 0o
The majority criticized the dissenters for not suggesting how this might
be done.'°9
The task of guiding and confining prosecutorial discretion is not
as impossible as the Supreme Court views it. The problem is, perhaps,
that the Court is viewing the concept of guided discretion from the
wrong standpoint. It does not necessarily follow from the fact of guided
discretion that the legislature or the judiciary would tell prosecutors
whom to prosecute, for whom to request the death penalty, or otherwise
be involved in the details of the prosecutorial function. The Court
should instead view the problem from the standpoint that some limitations on prosecutorial discretion are necessary and that it is possible
to impose such limitations constitutionally and without destroying or
even substantially inhibiting discretion.
104. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1790 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1778 n.37.
107. Id. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes
61-62.
108. Id. at 1805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1778 n.37.
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The shortcomings of the Georgia system are not the result of
prosecutors having discretion; rather, it is the use of that discretion
which is problematic. The prosecutors seem to be accountable to no
one, particularly since their actions are unreviewable."10 Kenneth Culp
Davis suggests that:
Especially unfortunate, in my opinion, is the complete lack
of supervision of the typical city or county prosecutor. He is
usually an elected official, and the theory is that he is responsible to the electorate. The reality is that nearly all his decisions
to prosecute or not to prosecute, nearly all of the influences
brought to bear upon such decisions, and nearly all his reasons
for decisions are carefully kept secret, so that review by the
electorate is nonexistent except for the occasional case that
happens to be publicized. The plain fact is that more than ninetenths of local prosecutors' decisions are supervised or reviewed
by no one.'
One way to hold prosecutors accountable is to require detailed
records. 2 Prosecuting attorneys should have to write a clear description
of their reasons for plea bargaining a capital murder case into a
voluntary manslaughter case. They should have to put in writing their
reasons for requesting or not requesting a penalty trial in capital murder
cases. Included should be the factors that make a case more (or less)
aggravated, and what mitigating factors are present or absent. It simply
is not enough to say a certain case is more aggravated than others-a
written explanation should exist in the case records as to why the case
is more aggravated. If the Supreme Court wishes to see the reasons
"well documented" for why a defendant in a particular case gets a
death sentence while others do not,"' then actual documentation should
be required.
110. Id. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Ill. DAvIs,

DIScIETIoNARY

112. See generally,

214 (1969).

JUSnCE: A

PRELIMINARY INQuiRY

Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

207-08 (1969).

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY,

188-

113. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in McCeskey, 753 F.2d 877

(1985), suggested that the reasons underlying prosecutors' discretionary decisions in
capital sentencing cases is "well documented." Id. at 899. The court stated that:
The marginal disparity based on the race of the victim tends to support the
state's contention that the system is working for differently from the one

which Furman condemned. In pre-Furmandays, there was no rhyme or reason
as to who got the death penalty and who did not. But now, in the vast
majority of cases, the reasons for a difference are well-documented. That they
are not so clear in a small percentage of the cases is no reason to declare the
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Additionally, the Court must be willing to grant limited review of
prosecutors' requests for penalty hearings in the same way it reviews
prosecutors' peremptory challenges of jurors, as decided in Batson v.
Kentucky," 4 and before that in Swain v. Alabama."5 According to the
rule of law in Batson, if a defendant can make a prima facie showing
that race was a basis for the prosecutor's excluding jurors in his case,
then the state must show that there was a legitimate reason for the
exclusions." 6 A prima facie showing of discrimination thus shifts the
burden of proof from the defendant to the state." 7 Batson overruled
the earlier case of Swain v. Alabama, which required a statistical
showing of discrimination in case after case. Swain held that showing
discrimination only in the defendant's case was not enough. The
Supreme Court in Batson called the Swain requirement of a statistical
showing of a pattern of discrimination a "crippling" burden of proof
for defendants to have to meet." 8 In fact, in twenty years it was met
only twice, and in both cases the prosecutor conceded that he had
discriminated on the basis of race." 9
The Swain burden of proof in jury selection cases was required
for 21 years. It was nearly insurmountable for most defendants. Batson
entire system unconstitutional.
Id.(emphasis added).
However, there is no Georgia statute requiring prosecutors to provide any written
documentation setting out the basis for their discretionary decisions in capital sentencing
cases.
In addition, in Fulton County where McCleskey was convicted, there is no selfimposed system whereby the prosecutor provides the "well-documented" evidence to
which the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court refer. Id. at 899, cited in McCleskey,
.107 S. Ct. at 1765.
Justice Blackmun's dissent aptly points to the fact that:
The sole effort to provide any consistency was Slaton's periodic pulling of
files at random to check on the progress of cases. Slaton explained that as
far as he knew, he was the only one aware of this checking. The files contained
information only as to the evidence in the case, not any indication as to why
an attorney made a particular decision. The attorneys were not required to
record why they sought an indictment for murder as opposed to a lesser
charge, or why they recommended a certain plea. The attorneys were not
required to report to Slaton the cases in which they decided not to seek the
death penalty, or the cases in which they did seek the death penalty.
107 S.Ct. at 1801 (emphasis added).
114. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
115. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
116. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
117. Id. See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972).
118. Id.at 92.
119. State v. Brown, 371 So.2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So.2d

1162 (La. 1979).
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replaced the Swain test with the requirement of showing discrimination
only in the instant case. 20 Ironically, McCleskey was denied relief
because he did not prove discrimination in his own case as required by
burden of
Batson, even though he met the more stringent "crippling"
2
'
proving a discriminatory pattern, as required by Swain.1
In refusing to review the propriety of the prosecutor's request for
a penalty trial in McCleskey's case, the Supreme Court referred to the
122
"public policy" reasons for not questioning prosecutors' decisions.
The Court cites the "policy considerations" behind prosecutorial disprosecutors to defend decisions
cretion as reason for not requiring
"years after they were made.' ' 23 Wayte v. United States'24 lists three
policy reasons for not reviewing discretionary acts by prosecutors: "(1)
examining the basis of a prosecution will chill law enforcement by
subjecting prosecutors' motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry;
(2) such examination may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
decisions to
revealing the government's enforcement policy; and ' (3)
25
prosecute are particularly ill-suited to judicial review.'
First, if there is nothing improper in a prosecutor's motives or
decisionmaking, the possibility of outside review should not affect
such decisionmaking. Second, while policy reasons (2) and (3) may be
true of decisions to prosecute for a crime, they simply do not apply
to decisions to request the death penalty. The law prohibiting murder
is not made unenforceable by letting the public know under what
circumstances a defendant will be executed rather than imprisoned.
And finally, if one makes the argument that death sentences must not
be imposed freakishly, without rhyme or reason, then there must
logically be some method for determining whether a given sentence
or group of sentences was so imposed. Judicial review would seem to
be the best method for ensuring this.
Another of the Court's objections to allowing review of prosecutorial decisions to seek penalty trials was the time lag between the
imposition of a defendant's sentence and the Supreme Court's hearing
of the appeal. Directly addressing this concern, requiring documentation
at each decisionmaking stage in a capital murder trial would eliminate
memory problems. The prosecutor would not be called upon to try to
remember "years later" why certain decisions were made. The reasons
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1768 n.16-17 and accompanying text.
Id.at 1768.
470 U.S. 598 (1985).
Id. at 607.
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would be readily available from the case records. In fact, it might not
be necessary for the prosecutor to testify at all because the Court could
simply demand the case files for review. Prosecutors who kept proper,
careful records could avoid having to appear before the Court to
defend the propriety of their discretionary decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court should recognize that if a defendant in a
capital sentencing case meets the burden of proof from either the Swain
or Batson cases, that is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the
state and require a showing of the documentation in the prosecutor's
case records. Depending on the facts of the particular case, either
burden of proof may be insurmountable, and therefore unfair. There
is no justification for distinguishing jury cases from capital sentencing
cases so as to allow judicial review of a prosecutor's discretionary juror
challenges, while refusing to allow review of a prosecutor's discretionary
requests for the death penalty. The first can prevent a fair trial on the
issue of guilt. The second can prevent a fair trial on the more compelling
issue of whether the defendant should live or die.
Both the McCleskey case and the Baldus Study arguably prove
that discretion should be guided at the prosecutorial level, as is now
done at the jury level. The Supreme Court argued that it would be too
difficult to produce guidelines for prosecutors that would not sacrifice
"the discretion essential to a humane and fair system of criminal
justice. '126 In refusing to infer abuse of discretion from the results in
the Baldus Study, the Court demands that there be an even greater risk
of racial discrimination in capital sentencing than shown by the petitioner in McCleskey.' 27 But as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in
McCleskey, "[d]iscretion is a means, not an end,' ' 28 and when the
Supreme Court is presented with evidence that race is more likely than
not to play a role in sentencing, "it is plainly insufficient to say that
the importance of discretion demands that the risk be higher before
[the Court] will act-for in such a case the very end that discretion is
designed to serve is being undermined. ' 129
126. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1778 n.37.
127. Id.at 1775. See also infra text accompanying note 129.
128. Id.at 1790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argues that the end
sought in allowing discretion to the sentencing authority is to allow each defendant in
a capital case to be treated with the degree of respect that is due the uniqueness of
each individual. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). Also, discretion is required
to meet the requirements in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976),
that each capital defendant's sentence be based on "a particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of [the individual defendant's] character and record."
129. McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1790 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AS A CHECK ON DISCRETION

The proportionality review conducted by the Georgia Supreme
Court should provide an extra step in the capital sentencing process
for identifyiig and correcting improper exercises of prosecutorial discretion. However, as the proportionality review is currently used, it
cannot ensure a proper evaluation of a defendant's death sentence
because the Georgia Court will, in all likelihood, compare it only to
other cases where the defendants received death sentences.'10 Professor
Baldus conducted a study in which he analyzed 68 of the 120 proportionality reviews the Georgia court has conducted. 3 ' For 88% of the
cases, the comparison cases cited by the court as being similar to the
32
defendants' were all death-sentence cases.
The Study shows a strong tendency by the Georgia Supreme Court
to "overselect" death cases for comparison, 33 in spite of the fact that
the method the court purports to apply in comparing sentences, the
salient factors method,' 3 possesses a moderate bias in favor of selecting
life sentences for comparison. " One reason for this result may be that
the court limits its universe of similar cases in two ways: First, the
court only looks at those cases where the prosecutor requested a penalty
trial, rather than looking at all convictions for capital murder;" 6 second,
130. Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 24, at 717.
131. Id. at 711.
132. Id. See also id. at Appendix A, 733-752. When the Georgia Supreme Court
conducts a proportionality review, it looks at the defendant's case and compares it to
other "similar" cases and the sentences given in those cases. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.,
supra note 18, at § 17-10-35(c)(3) and (e); common sense dictates that the court would
consider not only similar cases where the defendant received a death sentence, but also
those where the defendant received a life sentence. If the court only looks at other
death cases, it is unlikely to find the review case to be disproportionate. It is when the
case is compared to cases like it where the defendants received life sentences that the
case under review may be found to be disproportionate.
133. Baldus, Comparative Review, supra note 24, at 717.
134. Id. at 703-717. The "salient factors" method of choosing similar cases starts
by classifying other cases in terms of the statutory aggravating circumstances that exist
in the review case. Then other factors are used which seem to be especially related to
the imposition of the death sentence in the review case, for instance, the tender age of
the victim. The pool of cases selected is then compared to the review case. Because it
is difficult to find a large pool of cases which would be similar in facts, it is necessary
to choose some cases which are different in facts, perhaps, but which are similar in
terms of overall culpability. Id. at 681-820.
135. Id. at 717-18. When the Georgia court selects its pool of similar cases, it
overselects death sentence cases rather than life sentence cases. Thus, no death cases
ever look excessive in comparison. See id. at 718.
136. Id. at 721. Only 40 percent of capital murder convictions result in a penalty
trial.
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the court only examines those cases which are appealed, and defendants
who get life sentences are less likely to appeal than those who receive
death sentences.' 3 7 Combined, these limitations operate to eliminate
84% of all capital murder cases where the defendant was sentenced to
life imprisonment. 38 The result of these flaws is a system of,"proportionality review" which does not provide a true sense of proportion.
Each case should be examined in light of all other cases like it, including
those where life sentences were imposed. The court should then determine whether the review case is more like those where a life sentence
was imposed, or more like those where the defendant received a death
sentence.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Discretion is a means to assuring the kind of individualized justice
required of any capital sentencing system. Where discretion is allowed
to become the means for securing justice only to those deemed worthy,
and the worthy are racially selected, it becomes essential to re-evaluate
and limit its use.
The U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on the Georgia capital sentencing system to police itself to prevent abuse of discretion is simply
not working. Any presumption that the actors in that system will
exercise their discretion fairly, responsibly and in a racially neutral
manner is clearly misguided. In order to remedy the effect of improper
racial considerations in the exercise of discretion, two things must
be changed. The first step is to require the state to impose procedures
which will "guide" prosecutors' exercise of discretion and provide
a much greater degree of fairness and neutrality to the sentencing
process.
One way to accomplish this is to first require a written accounting
from prosecutors of the reasons for their decisions regarding requests
for death sentences. The state supreme court should then use that
documentation, along with a wider pool of comparison cases, to
determine whether each death sentence imposed was done so fairly and
proportionately, without any improper consideration of the race of the
victim or the race of the defendant. 3 9 All capital murder convictions,
whether appealed or not, and whether advanced to a penalty trial or
not, should be considered in a proportionality review. The court should
also provide for the kind of limited review of prosecutors' decision137. Id. at 721-22.
138. Id. at 721-22.
139. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
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4
making that is allowed in jury selection cases. 0 Finally, the Supreme
Court must be willing to examine discretionary exercises of power in
any case where a defendant can show either a statistically significant
risk that his sentence was affected by the impermissible consideration
of race or that there was official misconduct in his own case. Then
perhaps the capital sentencing system in Georgia may fulfill the Supreme
Court's vision of a fair, evenhanded process.

Regina M. Harris

140. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See also supra notes 114-125
and accompanying text.

